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promptness in filing their amendment on December 30, 1953,
after the parties had submitted arguments thereon, and prior
to the trial herein.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor,
and Schauer, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied November 23, 1955.

[L. A. No. 23641.

In Bank.

Oct. 28, 1955.]

FINANCIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY (a Corporation)
et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COUR'I.' OF
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; F. BRITTON
McCONNELL, as Insurance Commissioner, etc., Real
Party in Interest.
[1] Mandamus-Existence of Other Remedy.-A writ of mandate
must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1086.)
[2] Appeal-Right of A.ppeal.-An appeal is the usual course open
to a litigant who believes that the trial court has committed
error.
[Sa, 3b] Mandamus-To Courts.-Where the court mistakenly disposes of a matter before it on the ground that it has no jurisdiction and thereby precludes a decision on the merits, mandamus will issue to compel it to assume jurisdiction and to
decide the issues on the merits.
[4] Judgments-Res Judicata-Decision on Merits.-A dismissal
of a proceeding or a denial of relief on the sole ground of
lack of jurisdiction is not a decision on the merits.
[5] Insurance- Corporations- Insolvency- Powers of Commissioner.-There is no implied restriction in the statute govern[1] See Cal.Jur., Mandamus, § 17; Am.Jur., Mandamus, §50.
[5] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), Insurance,§ 169 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 15; [2] Appeal and
Error, § 2; [3) Mandamus, § 37; [4] Judgments, § 350; [5, 6, 8,
10, 14] Insurance. § 11.4; [7] Constitutional Law, ~ 177; [9, 11]
Injunctiom;; ~ 19(2); [12] Iwmnmce, § 11.23; [131 16] Insurance,
§ 11; (15] Insurance, §§ 11.23, 12.

396

FINANCIAL INDEM.
pr•OCtledrni~S

Co. v. SuPERIOR CouRT [ 45 C.2d

in case of insolvency of an insurance company
et
that the commissioner act only where
existence of dangerous condition is beyond dispute.
[6] Id.-Corpo:rations-Insolvency-Powers of Commissioner.-In
his application for conservatorship of an insurance
company, the commissioner does not seek a judicial appointment and a
ruling that the company is in fact insolvent, and
obtaining his original ex parte order he is not
required to show to the court that the company was in fact in
a hazardous condition, but only that he, as a state officer, invested by legislative authority with the power, has so determined and found.
[7] Constitutional Law-Due Process-Notice and Hearing.-Although the requirements of due process often involve a prior
full hearing, where public necessity requires there can be
action followed by a hearing.
[8] Insurance- Corporations- Insolvency- Powers of Commissioner.-The only requirement for judicial action on the
commissioner's application for conservatorship of an insurance company is his determination that he believes a hazardous
condition exists which jeopardizes the future of the company,
and on an application stating those facts the court "shall"
issue the order for conservatorship, the statutory word "shall"
as thus used being mandatory.
[9] Injunctions - Matters Controllable - Official Duties. - Civ.
Code, § 3423, subd. 4, and Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. 4, declaring that an injunction cannot be granted "to prevent the
execution of a public statute, by officers of the law, for the
public benefit," do not bar judicial action where the invalidity
of the statute under which an officer is acting is shown, or
where the officer exceeds his powers.
[10] Insurance-Corporations-Insolvency-Powers of Commissioner.-Ins. Code, §§ 1011, 1013, relating to proceedings in
case of insolvency of an insurance company, are valid, and
if the commissioner follows the statutory procedure and
certifies that certain conditions exist, his action cannot be
successfully challenged on the ground of excess of authority.
[11] Injunctions-Matters Controllable-Official Duties.-Courts
of equity have no power by injunction to restrain a public
officer from performing an official act that he is required by
valid law to perform.
[12] Insurance-Corporations-Insolvency-Actions Against Commissioner.-A court is not vested with jurisdiction to issue
an injunction by an allegation in the pleadings that the Insurance Commissioner has abused his discretion or acted in
bad faith.
[13] '!d.-Corporations-Insolvency-Purpose of Statutes.-The
primary purpose for the drastic remedy provided by Ins. Code,
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1011, 1013, is to prevent dissipation of the assets of an insurance company after the commissioner has determined that
a hazardous condition exists.
[14] Id.-Corpm:ationn-Insolvency-Powers of Commissioner.To allow a court to delay conservatorship of an insura!lc(
company while it determines the motives of the commissioner
would as effectively defeat the purpose of Ins. Code, §§ 1011,
1013, as to postpone the conservatorship while the existence
or nonexistence of the hazardous condition is judicially established. (Disapproving any dictum in Rhode Island Ins. Co.
v. Downey, 95 Cal.App.2d 220, 212 P.2d 965, to the contrary.)
[15] !d.-Corporations-Insolvency-Legislative Intent: Injunctions.-The Insuranee Code indicates a legislative intent to
create a system to protect the public interest in insurance
companies which may have become insolvent, and the issuance
of an injunction against the commissioner, who has filed an
application for conservatorship of sneh a company, would defeat the purpose of such statutes.
[16] Id. -Corporations- Insolvency- Legislative Intent. - The
Legislature has determined that possible irreparable injury
to an insurance company because of conservatorship must be
subordinated to the public interest.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County to hear an order to show cause why
the Insurance Commissioner should not be restrained from
taking over and conducting the business of an insurance company. Demurrers to petition for writ of mandate sustained.
and order to show cause vacated; application for leave to produce additional evidence denied.
John S. Bolton, Wright, Wright, Green & Wright, Loyd
Wright and Dudley K. Wright for Petitioners.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and William E.
J_;amoreaux, Deputy County Counsel for Respondent.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Everett W. Mattoon, Assistant Attorney General, and Lee B. Stanton, Deputy
Attorney General, for Real Party in Interest.
EDMONDS, J.-G. Kenneth Vaughn is the owner of all
of the outstanding capital stock of Financial Indemnity Company, a California corporation licensed to do business as an
insurer in this state. The company and Vaughn commenced
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an action in the superior court seeking declaratory relief and
an injunction to prevent the Insurance Commissioner from
taking over the assets of the corporation. As ground for
justifying judicial interference with the purpose of the Insurance Commissioner, it is alleged that the condition of the
company does not come within the statutory conditions allowing him to take charge of its affairs.
On the day after that action was commenced, the commissioner pr~sented in open court an application for conservatorship pursuant to the provisions of section 1011 of
the Insurance Code. 1 Vaughn and the company requested
the court to issue an order to show cause and a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the commissioner from filing his
application. The court refused to do so, upon the ground
that "it does not have any jurisdiction in such matters until
the commissioner files a petition under section 1011 or summarily seizes the company under section 1013 2 • • • If the
court issued an injunction herein it would . . . [usurp] the
discretion exclusively vested in the commissioner to determine
and find, in the first instance, whether or not conditions justifying seizure existed.''
Vaughn and the company then filed in the District Court
of Appeal the present proceeding in mandamus. That court
ordered the superior court to show cause why a writ of
mandate should not issue requiring the court to proceed to
a hearing and determination of the action for declaratory
relief and injunction. It also provided that "pending the
hearing of such order to show cause, you are directed to take
no action calculated to affect the pendency of said cause except
to proceed with the trial thereof.''
The Insurance Commissioner, as the real party in interest,
noticed a motion to vacate the order to show cause, or for
modification of it, by deleting the portion which prohibited
'Section 1011 : ''The superior court . . . shall, upon the filing of
the commissioner of the verified application showing any of the following
conditions hereinafter enumerated to exist, issue its order vesting title
to all of the assets of such person, wheresoever situated, in the commissioner . . . . ''
"Section 1013: ''Whenever it appears to the commissioner that any
of the condition~ set forth in section lOll exist or that irreparable loss
and injury to the property and business of a person specified in section
1010 has occurred or may occur unless the commissioner so act immediately, the commissioner, without notice and before applying to the court
for any order, forthwith shall take possession of the property, business,
books, records and accounts of such person, and of the offices and premises
••• and retain possession subject to the order of the court•••• "
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him from filing an application for conservatorship pending
the hearing. He also filed a return by way of demurrer,
alleging that the petition for mandamus does not state a cause
of action because the court has no jurisdiction over the
respondent superior court, or the subject matter of the petition. By ans·wer, the commissioner denies specifically and
generally each and every allegation except those pertaining
to the corporate status of the company. Vaughn's stock interest, the pendency of the action in the superior court and
its refusal to act in the matter. As an affirmaive defense,
he attacks the petition upon the same grounds presented by
the demurrer. The superior court demurred to the petition
upon the grounds that it does not state facts sufficient to
entitle the petitioners to the remedy sought.
Vaughn and the company contend that the commissioner
is attempting to apply sections lOll and 1013 of the Insurance
Code in an unconstitutional manner, in that he threatens
to take over the company for reasons not specified by
the statute. Such action, the argument continues. would deprive the petitioners of their property rights without due
process of law. The position of the commissioner and the
respondent court is that the writ should be denied because
(1) the superior court has passed on the matter and its order
is appealable; (2) the pendency of an action for declaratory
relief and an injunction does not enlarge the jurisdiction
of the court nor bar the commissioner from acting pursuant
to section 1011 of the Insurance Code; (3) when an application is filed by the commissioner pursuant to statute, it is
the mandatory duty of the respondent court to issue a vesting
order; and ( 4) the courts have no jurisdiction to enjoin state
officers from the execution of constitutional statutes for the
public benefit.
(1] Section 1086 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
that the writ of mandate "must be issued in all cases where
there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the
ordinary course of law." [2] "An appeal is the usual
course open to a litigant who believes that the trial court has
committed error." (Phe7an v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d
363, 366 [217 P.2d 951].) [3a] However, where the court
disposes of a matter before it upon the ground that it has
no jurisdiction, and thereby precludes a decision on the
merits, mandamus has been issued to compel the court to
decide the issues upon the merits. (See Cahill v. Superior
Court, 145 Cal. 42 [78 P. 467] ; Tirnes-JJf.irror Co. v. Superior
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Court, 3 Cal.2d 30!:1
P.2d 547 J ; Levy v. Superwr Court,
15 Cal.2d 692 [104 P.2d 770, 129 A.L.R. 956].) [4] A dismissal of a proceeding or a denial of relief on the sole
ground of lack of jurisdiction is not a decision on the merits.
(See Hogeberg v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 201 Cal. 169, 182-183
[256 P. 413] ; Helvey v. Castles, 73 Cal.App.2d 667, 672
.J [3b] And in ](atenkamp v. Superior Court,
[167 P.2d
16 Cal.2d 696 at page 698 [108 P.2d 1], the court said, "If
a court is mistaken in its assumption that it does not possess
the requisite jurisdiction, mandamus will issue to compel it
to assume jurisdiction.''
The trial court's refusal to issue the requested order to
show cause and temporary restraining order was based
squarely upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The decisive
question, therefore, in the pn•sent proceeding is whether, upon
any theory reasonably to be drawn from the facts stated in
the complaint of Vaughn and the company, the commissioner
may be enjoined from filing an application for conservatorship.
The purpose of Vaughn and the company is to have the
issue of whether grounds for conservatorship exist determined
before the commissioner is allowed to take over the company.
They assert that if the conditions provided by statute as
grounds for taking over the business of an insurer do not
exist, an order allowing the commissioner to do so would
amount to an application of the provisions of the Insurance
Code against them in an unconstitutional manner. This argument assumes that any error in judgment by the commissioner
would be a violation of constitutional rights. [5] But as
was said in Rhode Island Ins. Co. v. Downey, 95 Cai.App.2d
220, 230-231 [212 P.2d 965], "It is not a requirement of the
statute . . . , that such matters not be disputable. The Legislature undoubtedly assumed that in most cases the company
involved would dispute the commissioner's contentions, and
accordingly provided. in section 1012 3 for a full hearing
before the trial court, at which the company could show that
the conditions claimed by the commissioner did not exist.
There is no implied restriction in the statute that the com'Section 1012: ''Said order shall continue in force and effect until,
on the application of either of the commissioner or of such person, it
shall, after a full hearing, appear to said court that the ground for said
order directing the commissioner to take title and possession does not
exist or has be(•n removed and thnt said person can properly resume
title and possession of its property and the conduct of its business.''
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missioner act only where the existence of the dangerous
condition is beyond dispute.''
In the Rhode Island case the commissioner obtained an
order appointing him conservator. The company sought a
writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate the
order, contending, among other points, that the facts did
not justify the commissioner's action. [6] The court refused to issue the writ, saying, ''The statute, as construed
by the California courts, requires only that the commissioner
file a verified application stating that he has found one, or
more. of the statutory grounds to exist. 'In making his
application under section 1011 of the Insurance Code, the
commiss1oner does not seek a judicial appointment and a
judicial ruling that the company is in fact delinq1tent. By
his application the commissioner merely represents that he
has found certain conditions to exist and has made his official
administrative determination to proceed as authorized by the
statute. In obtaining his original ex parte order, the commissioner is not required to show to the court that the company was in fact in a hazardous condition, but only that he,
as a state officer, invested by legislative authority with the
power, has so "determined" and "found."' (Caminetti v. Imperial Mut. L. Ins. Co., 59 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 [139 P.2d
681] . . . ; emphasis added.)" (Pp. 230, 231.)
The court not only concluded that the issues must be heard
in a proceeding brought pursuant to section 1012 but also
held that an order made in accordance with its provisions is
not a deprivation of due process. [7] ''Although the requirements of due process often involve a prior full hearing, it
has long been recognized that where public necessity requires,
there can be action followed by a hearing . . . . " (P. 235.)
(Also see Carpenter v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.
2d 307, 324 [74 P.2d 761]; State Savings etc. Bank v. Anderson, 165 Cal. 437 [132 P. 755, hR.A. 1915E 65]; North
American Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Richardson, 6 Cal.2d 90 r56
P.2d 1221].)
"It must be remembered that insurance
companies, like banks and building and loan companies, are
charged with a public interest, and hence, the price of doing
business is the fact that whenever a condition exists which
the insurance commissioner feels is hazardous, he may take
over the company and the question of whether he was justified
in doing so is thereafter threshed out." (P. 233.)
The I1egislature has provided a procedure by which the
public interest in insurance companies may be protected.
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[8] The only requirement for judicial action upon the
application of the commissioner is his determination that he
believes a hazardous condition exists which jeopardizes the
future of the company. Upon an application stating those
facts, the code provides Hwt the court ''shall '' issue the
order for conservatorship. The wore! "shall" as used in the
Insurance Code, is mandatory. ( § 16.)
[9] Section 3423, subdivision 4, of the Civil Code and
also section 526, subdivision 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure provide that an injunction canuot be granted ''to
preyeut the execution of a public statute, by officers of the
law, for the public benefit." Thes•: sections do not bar judicial
action where th1• invalidity of tbe statute under whieh he is
acting is shown (Reclamation Dlst. No. 1500 v. Superior
Court, 171 Cal. G72 [154 P. 8451) or when the offieer exeeeds
his powers. (Cowell v. Martin, 43 CaL 605.) [10] However, sections 1011 and 1013 of the Insurance Code haYe been
upheld as valid (Rhode Island Ins. Co. v. Downey, 95 CaL
App.2cl 220 [212 P.2d 965] ), and if the commiRsioner follows the statutory procedure and certifies that ecr1 a in conditions exist, his action cannot be successfully challenged
on the ground of excess of authority.
[11] In Southern Oregon Co. v. ()uine, 70 Ore. G3 [139
P. 332], the court said, "We think the law is fixed, beyond
cavil, that courts of equity have no power by ll1Jltndion to
restrain a public officer from pcrformi11g an official act that
he is required by valid law to perform. It is not sufficient
to clothe the ('OUrt with jnrisdietion to say simply that, unless the court extends its restraining hand, hardships 1Yill
follo\Y, or irreparable damage will enwe, because the officer
(lelegated to execute such law may act umYisely or injuriously
to the party seeking relief. The acts must be such as are without the sanction of a sound law." This statement has been
quoted with approval by the courts of this state.
(See
Reclamation Dist. No. 1500 v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. 672
[154 P. 845]; Loftis v. Superior Court, 25 Cai.App.2d 346,
353 [77 P.2d 491] .)
[12] A court is not vested with jurisdiction to issue an
injunction by an allegation i11 the pleadings that the commissioner has abused his discretion or acted in bad faith.
[13] The primary pL1rpose for the drastic remedy provided
by sections 1011 and 1013 of the Insurance Code is to prevent dissipation of the aRsets of the company after the commissioner has determined that a hazardous condition exists.
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[14] To allow a court to delay conservatorship while it determines the motives of the commissioner would as effectively
defeat that purpose as to postpone the conservatorship while
the existence or nonexistence of the hazardous condition is
judicially established. Any dictum in the Rhode Island case
to the contrary is disapproved.
In Modern Barber Colleges, Inc. v. Cal1fornia Emp. Stab.
Com., 31 CaL2d 720 [192 P.2d 916], this court refused to
compel, by writ of mandate, the cancellation of charges made
against the petitioner for amounts assertedly due under the
Unemployment Insurance Act. It was held that judicial review
of the collection may be had only after payment under protest.
That act provides that no injunction or writ of mandate shall
issue to prevent or enjoin the collection of contributions.
In upholding the statute, the court said, "If proceedings
which halt the collection of the tax were allowed to be
brought before the payments are made, the povver would be
placed in the hands of employers to so delay the creation
of the fund as to frustrate the purposes of the act. It has
been expressly declared by this court that these purposes
are of great public importance, and that procedural obstacles
which would delay or prevent their fulfillment are to be
avoided." (P. 732.)
[15] The Insurance Code clearly indicates a legislative
intent to create a system to protect the public interest in
iusuranee companies. The issuance of an injunction would
defeat the purpose of such statutes. (See Moore v. S1tperior
Court, 6 CaL2d 421, 424 [57 P.2d 1314].) [16] The Legislature has determined that possible irreparable injury to the
company must be subordinated to the public interest. (See
Rhode Island ins. Co. v. Downey, 95 CaLApp.2d 220 [212
P.2d D65]; North American Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Richardson, 6 CaL2d 90 [56 P.2d 1221]; State Savings etc. Bank v.
Anderson, 165 Cal. 437 [132 P. 755, L.R.A. 1915E 65].)
'rhe petitioners have filed an application for leave to present additional evidence. They claim that an examination
of the company's financial condition, recently completed by
the Insurance Commissioner, shows that it is solvent. They
do not state the purpose for which the evidence is offered.
but apparently it is in support of their position that the contemplated application by the commissioner for an order
authorizing him to conduct the business as conservator is
not to be :made upon statutory grounds.
For the reasons which have been stated, the petition for
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mandate presents no tenable
for judicial interference with the exercise of the eommissioner 's official duty.
Although after an order has been made upon sueb an applieation, evidence of the insurer's solveney would be relevant
in a hearing condneted pursuant to section ] 012 of the Insnrance Code, it has 110 bearing upon the issue in the present
proceeding. Upon the record before him. the trial judge
was correct m the eonclusion that the court was without
jul'isdiction to enjoin the commissioner from making sneh
a ppl ieation.
'l'he applieation for leave to prodnee additional evidenee
is denier1. The demnrrers to the petition for a writ of mandate are snstained. and the order to show ranse is varated.
Gibson, C. J ., Shenk, J ., 'l'raynor, J ., and Spcnee, J ., concurred.
CAH'fER, J.-I dissent.
'I'he majority opinion holds that the superior eonrt has
no jurisdietion in an aetion whieb seeks deelaratory r·elief
and an mjnnction ag·ainst the Insurance Commissioner who.
it is charged, is th1·eatening to abusP and exceed his statutory
power with respeet to assuming coutrol over plaintiff insurance company pnq)()rtedly be(•ans<· it is in an tmstable
financial condition. ft is pointed out that the eommission
may seize a company if ePrtain 1:onditiom; exist either with
or without a proeeeding in court. (lm; Cock § ~ 10]], 1013.)
In the action of which the majority says the superior court
did not have jnrisdietion, the plaintiff alleges in its complaint
ample facts to give the court jnrisdietion. The eomplaint
must be aeeepted as true as the question involved is solely
whether the action is one in whieh the eourt has jnrisrlietion.
It is allegwl that the fnsnranee Commissioner has been investigating plaintiff sinee its organization and has claimed
that plaintiff Va nghn is not a proper person to hold the
sto(ok of the plaintiff' and that it was insolvent: that plaintiff
is solvent:* that during the (•ommiRsioner's investigation,
his subordinates ''exhibited an "xtreme personal animosity
to offieers, dirf•etors. employees and eonnsel for plaintiff
and both the financial reports and the reports on the conditions of the company haYe been motivated by bias and
prejudiee, and a desire to aceomplish the removal of G. Kenneth Vaug·hn and his family from thr insnranre business";
* lt

off<1r~

evidence here to show beyond doubt that it was and is solvent.
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that as a result of the aetion of the eommissioner and his
subordinates and the threat to take the specified action irreparable injury has rPsulted and will result, that a new and
unimJlC'at:hable board of directors for plaintiff has been elected
and .. Then' is not. and there is no elaim by defendants that
there is. any hazardous eoml itions in the management of
plaintiff company nndcr present management: no member of
the \raughn family hal' any control in the management or
eonduet of the business of said company
· "rhe financial condition of ~aid plaintiff company is exet•eding!y strong and its net earnings and policy holders'
surplus have. and are. increasing snbstantially, and the defendants do not and eannot make any claim that the company
is not now in a sound financial condition ancl solvent within
the meanillg of the Insurance Code. There is uo claim that
the public-, polic-yholders, or creditors are or will he exposed
to any detriment. .
"Ddendant~"; herein have never afforded to plaintiffs an
opportunity to presPnt their case• before an impartial tribunal.
either administrative or judicial, and have never issued any
ruJ ing or order directing plaintiffs to comply with or correct
any alleged noncomplianc-e with any provision of the InsurancP Code.''
The authorities are c~lear that a perso11 may have declaratory
relief and injnnetive relief against a public nffieer when
sueh officer'~ aets will cam;e him to be deprived of eonstitutional rights, or whell the officer is aeting arbitrarily
and outside the scope of t he• powers given to him by statute
when such action will eause irreparable harm to the person.
In Brock v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.2d 682 rs1 P.2rl !J31 J,
petitioner. the State Direc:tor of Agriculture. sought prohibition to restrain the trial in an action by plaint.iffs against
defendant director to have him rPstrained from enfore.ing
the milk eontrol act beeanse he had failed to follow the law
establishing the milk control area. This court denied prohibition and found that the trial <"onrt harl jurisdietion nf
the action. We stated (page 684) : "Tn support of their
demand for an injunc-tion again:;t th(" director of agrieulture,
tlte plaintiffs allege that the direetor of agriculture failed
to comply with the provisions of the Milk Control Act in
the formation of said area and in the establishment of the
amended Stabilization and Marketing Plan for the sale of
milk and <:ream within said area.
" •.. The defendant in said action, the director of agri-
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culture, was present both upon the application for a restraining order, and at the hearing of the order to show
cause why a temporary injunction should not issue. Hi,
contention on these occasions, and his contention now, is that
the Milk Control Act is presumed to be valid, and that the
defendant as a public officer is presumed to have regularly
performed his official duty in the organization of said area
and in the establishing of said stabilization and marketing
plan, and, therefore, no injunction may be issued to prevent
the execution of said statute by him as such public officer
without the establishment, after due hearing, of the invalidity
of his acts, and that until such hearing and the final determination that his acts are illegal, tht- courts are without
jurisdiction to issue an injunction restraining him from
attempting to enforce the statute . . . .
"Petitioner relies upon section 526 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and section 8423 of the Civil Code. The fourth
subdivision of each of these sections provides that an injunction will not lie to prevent the execution of a public
statute by an officer of the law for the public benefit. But
petitioner concedes, as we understand his position, that if it
be determined after a trial that the officer is acting illegally,
then it is within the power of the court to restrain his acts.
These code sections therefore do not answer our present
inquiry.
''. . . The case before the trial court in that instance was
precisely like that involved in a recent case decided by this
court where we held that as there were issues of fact tendered
by the complaint in an injunctive proceeding, the trial court
had jurisdiction to try these issues of fact, and that prohibition
would not lie to restrain the trial court from issuing an
injunction against an officer in an attempt to enforce a public
statute, until these issues of fact were determined. (Ag1·icnltuml Prorate Com. v. Superior C01trt, 5 Cal.2d 550 [55
P.2d 495] .) In that case our decision upon this point is as
follows : 'In the injunction suit before the respondent court
the plaintiffs therein made the claim that the prorate district
in which the applicants were purporting to act as officers
was never legally formed or organized in that the petition
for the formation of said district was never signed by the
necessary two-thirds of the lemon producers residing in said
proposed district or zone, and therefore the commission had
no authority to make its orC!er
n9,· said district wii·hout
an election being held therein to pass upon the question of
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the formation of said clistriet. This e!aim on the part of said
plaintiffs was set forth in parngTapb XX of their complaint
in whieh it is alleged among other things that "said petition
was not
by two-thirds or more in numbC'r of the proclneers of lemons in California, nor by the owners of twothirds or more of the producing faetors of lemons in California.'' If that allegation is true, then the district was not
legally formed or organized, and if it was not so organized,
an injunction against the applicants restraining them from
exeeuting the terms of said act would lie. On the hearing
of the applieation for a temporary injunetion, an affidavit
was filed whieh purported to deny the allegations of paragraph XX of the said complaint. TherC' is nothing, however,
in the reeord before us to indicate that the respondent eourt
has ever passed upon the issue tendered by the allegations
oi' said paragraph XX. In faet, it would be rather unusual
for the court to finally pass upon an issue of fact on an
applieation for a temporary injunetion This issue of faet,
however, was presented by the plaintiffs in the injunetion
suit and the court had jurisdiction to deeide it. So far it
has never done so. The injunetion suit is still in the respondent eourt, and the court has exclusive jurisdietion to
hear and determine all undeeided issues of faets presented by
the pleadings in such suit. Should it determine that said
distriet was legally organized and that th(~ orders whieh the
plaintiffs in said action seek to restrain are valid and binding
upon those to whom they are directed, then it would be the
duty of said court to deny the injunetion and dismiss the
suit. On the other hand, shonld the trial eourt find in favor
of the plaintiffs in said suit upon the allegations of said
paragraph XX, then it would necessarily follow that said
orders would have no legal support and the defendants in said
f>Uit should b<' enjoined from enforcing them. For this reason
the applieation for a \vTit of prohibition direeted to respondents restraining them from proceeding in said action should
be denied.'
'' \V e see no reason to recede from the position taken in
the deeision of that case. It appears to us to be the only
reasonable conclusion that ean be reached in proeeedings of
that Hature. To hold otherwise would be to tie the hands of
the conrt in cases in which great and irreparable injury
might be done private citizens by officers acting under a misof their authority."
takrn
'l'he same holding prevailed in Brock v. Superior Court,
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12 Cal.2d 605 [86 P.2d 805]; Agr'iC1llttlral Prorate Com. v.
Superior Court, 5 CaL2d 550 [55 P.2d 495]; and Agricultural
Prorate Com. v. Stlperior Co11rt, 31 Cal.App.2d 518 r88 P.2d
25:3]. In the latter case (at p. 523). the court said: "The
second point, that the order of the respondent court violated
certain code provisions. is not well taken. for if the officers
were in fact acting illegally, it is, as held in the foregoing ea;;;e,
within the power of the court to restrain their acts. . . .
'' 'To hold otherwise would be to tie the hands of the court
in cases in which great and irreparable injury might be
done private citizens by officers acting under a mistaken
belief of their authority.' " (Brock v. Sttperior Cmtrt, supra,
11 Cal.2d 682.)
Similarly, in the instant case the superior court had jurisdiction to determine whether the commissioner's threatened
action was illegal. There can be no doubt that the injury to
plaintiff insurance company will be irreparable if it is taken
over by the commissioner. Its eredit and standing will be
seriously impaired.
The majority opinion states that plaintiff has its relief by
an attack on the seizure after it has been accomplished (Ins.
Code, § 1012) and that that remedy is exclusive. There is
nothing in the Insurance Code which makes it the exclusive
remedy as there was in the case of Modern Barber Colleges,
Inc. v. California Emp. Stab. Com., 31 Cal.2d 720 [192 P.2d
916], relied upon by the majority. It must be remembered
that plaintiff's action was for declaratory, as well as injunctive, relief and, furthermore, we held in California Physicians'
Service v. Garrison, 28 Cal.2d 790, 801 [172 P.2d 4, 167
A.L.R. 306], that "section 1062 of the Code of Civil Procedure
expressly provides that the remedy through declaratory relief
is cumulative and not restrictive of any other remedy provided by law.'' The court was there speaking of an action
wherein plaintiff sought to have the court declare that the
Insurance Code did not apply to its membrrs' bnsinrss.
I would, therefore, grant the writ of mandate prayed for
herein.
Schauer, J., concurred.
Petitioners' application for a rehearing was dE'nied November· 23, 1955. Cartrr, ,J., and Schauer, ,J., were of the opinion
that the application should be granted.

